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I argue that Hartmann’s engagement in the question of the value of aesthetic experience (especially as ad-
dressed in Chapter 35 of his Aesthetics) is a specific reinterpretation of the standpoint that we come across 
in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. Hartmann completed his Aesthetics at the end of World War II and some of 
the central claims in his work echo Nietzsche’s standpoint, as presented in the early work on tragedy, which 
Nietzsche completed during the Franco-Prussian war. Both studies invite us to ask: what are we to expect 
from philosophy under such circumstances? Like Nietzsche, Hartmann holds the view that 1) our lives 
are intrinsically meaningless, that 2) the world is indifferent to meaning, and that 3) aesthetic experience 
has value insofar as it bestows meaning both on the world and on human existence. Despite the far-reach-
ing thematic and stylistic differences between Hartmann and Nietzsche, both thinkers see aesthetics not as 
a form of apolitical escapism, but as a direct way of confronting the fundamental problem, which concerns 
“the sense and meaning of the world and of human life.” They both leave us with the paradoxical and pro-
vocative thesis that aesthetic experience is exactly what is needed at the times of political crises. 
Key words: Аesthetic experience, aesthetic values, aesthetic qualities, aesthetic creativity, aesthetic 
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Я утверждаю, что вклад Гартмана в обсуждение вопроса о ценности эстетического опыта (осо-
бенно в том виде, в каком он рассматривается в гл. 35 его Эстетики) — это специфическое 
переосмысление точки зрения, с которой мы сталкиваемся в Рождении трагедии Ницше. Гарт-
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ман завершил свою Эстетику в конце Второй Мировой Войны, и некоторые из центральных 
утверждений в его работе перекликаются с точкой зрения Ницше, представленной в ранней 
работе о  трагедии, которую Ницше завершил во время франко-прусской войны. Оба иссле-
дования приглашают нас спросить: чего мы должны ожидать от философии в  таких обсто-
ятельствах? Как и  Ницше, Гартман придерживается мнения, что 1)  наша жизнь изначально 
бессмысленна; 2) мир безразличен к смыслу; 3) эстетический опыт имеет ценность, поскольку 
он придает смысл как миру, так и человеческому существованию. Несмотря на значительные 
тематические и стилистические различия, оба мыслителя рассматривают эстетику не как фор-
му аполитичного эскапизма, а как прямой способ решения фундаментальных проблем, касаю-
щихся «смысла и значения мира и человеческой жизни». Оба мыслителя оставляют нас с пара-
доксальным и провокационным тезисом о том, что эстетический опыт — это именно то, что 
нужно в эпоху политического кризиса.
Ключевые слова: Эстетический опыт, эстетические ценности, эстетические качества, эстетиче-
ское творчество, эстетическая осмысленность, Гартман, Ницше.
Nicolai Hartmann completed the first sketch of his Aesthetics in the summer of 
1945 in Babelsberg near Potsdam. As Frida Hartmann notes in the Postscript that she 
wrote to her husband’s Aesthetics in June 1953
he began the manuscript of the 9th of March, and completed it on the 11th of Septem-
ber. This was the time of the destruction of Potsdam, the encirclement and conquest of 
Berlin, and, in general, of hunger, uncertainty and confusion […]. In the midst of this 
collapse he wrote his pages, day by day1. (Hartmann, 2014)
The first years after the war were filled with too many other concerns and there-
fore, Hartmann could not start revising the manuscript as was his lifelong practice 
with other works he had written before. He started working on the new manuscript 
five years later, in 1950, and he passed away before the revisions were complete. The 
revised manuscript “breaks off with the words, ‘Ideas in Poetry,’ the heading on page 
196 […] From page 196 to the end, this edition follows the first manuscript,” which 
Hartmann was working on in 1945, in “complete severance from the outside world.”
Hartmann’s Aesthetics offers a remarkably detailed and sober analysis of some 
central issues in the field, and especially the way it was conceptualized in the first half 
of the twentieth century. It addresses beauty in all its generality: in nature as well as in 
diverse forms of art (painting, music, architecture, and ornamentation); it pursues a 
lucid analysis of the structure of aesthetic experience, taken both in terms of its recep-
tivity and creativity; it offers a somber analysis of aesthetic values. Yet keeping in mind 
the circumstances under which it was composed, one cannot help but be surprised: 
1 As Eugene Kelly mentioned to me in a recent conversation, Hartmann wrote this work not ‘day by 
day,’ but night by night, when his children were asleep and nobody in the house would disturb him.
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What sense are we to make of a detailed study of all these themes undertaken in the 
final months, weeks and days of the war? 
I do not wish to offer a historically-oriented analysis of Hartmann’s life at this 
historical moment. The question that I wish to address is more philosophical: what 
should one expect from philosophy under such circumstances? Does philosophy have 
the right to turn to such seemingly apolitical themes under such conditions? Does 
a philosopher not compromise the significance of his own philosophy by turning to 
such ‘safe themes’ under such disturbing circumstances2? Let us not forget that Hart-
mann, who in the first half of the twentieth century was considered to be one of the 
central figures in German philosophy, was almost entirely forgotten in the second 
half of the twentieth century and remains largely forgotten to this very day. Does this 
forgetfulness not derive from his silence about the ‘burning questions’ of the day? 
The situation is highly ironic, for those German philosophers who were quite actively 
involved in the fascist movement in Germany before the war, retained their influ-
ence worldwide after the war for the reasons that, presumably, their reflections had 
something to contribute to our understanding of the human condition in general, and 
political situation in particular. By contrast, Hartmann, who never compromised with 
Nazism, remains a largely forgotten figure. 
Hartmann’s political silence can be interpreted at least in four ways. First, one 
could see it as a straightforward form of escapism. Is there any other field that could 
provide one with a better possibility to withdraw than aesthetics? Secondly, one could 
also argue that it is motivated by philosophical commitment and dedication, to which 
one could further add that external pressures not so rarely create a sense of contrast 
which can prove to be highly conducive to intellectual work. Thirdly, one could also 
maintain that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Hartmann’s aesthetics is 
an indirect way of dealing with the circumstances at hand. Fourthly, one cannot dis-
count the possibility that we face here a mixture of the three elements just mentioned. 
I am especially intrigued by the third possibility and in what follows, I will try to pro-
vide some reasons to defend such an interpretation.
Despite all the inner serenity and intellectual commitment from the outside 
world that the composition of such a work must have called for, Hartmann appears to 
have been well aware that his situation was neither unique, nor unprecedented. The 
historical and political circumstances that surround the composition of his Aesthetics 
2 Let me note in passing that Hartmann is certainly not the only intellectual to have addressed seem-
ingly distant themes during World War II. At the same time, in St Petersburg, Olga Mikhailovna 
Freidenberg was working on her famous study of mythology while Maria Yefimovna Sergeyenko on 
the no-less famous study of agriculture in the Roman Empire.
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are very much the same as those under which Friedrich Nietzsche composed his Birth 
of Tragedy. Nietzsche wrote this work during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–1871. 
In the “Attempt at a Self-Criticism,” which he republished along with the Birth of Trag-
edy in 1886, Nietzsche writes:
While the thunderclap of the Battle of Wörth was reverberating across Europe, the med-
itative lover of enigmas whose lot it was to father this book sat somewhere in a corner 
of the Alps, extremely reflective and perplexed (thus simultaneously very distressed and 
carefree) and wrote down his thoughts […]. A few weeks after that, he found himself 
under the walls of Metz […] in that month of the deepest tension, as peace was being ne-
gotiated in Versailles, he finally came to peace with himself and […] finished composing 
the Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music. (Nietzsche, 2000, 17)
Besides the circumstances under which both works were composed, is there an-
ything else that they share? The styles in which they are written, the thoughts they ar-
ticulate, and the contributions they make are fundamentally unlike each other. More-
over, Hartmann’s Aesthetics is his mature work, whose revisions were interrupted by 
the author’s death. By contrast, The Birth of Tragedy is Nietzsche’s first book, “also in 
every bad sense of that label” (Nietzsche, 2000, 19), as Nietzsche was to add in 1886.
The far-reaching differences between these works should not overshadow one 
fundamental affinity between them—an affinity that directly relates to the circum-
stances under which these two masterpieces in aesthetics were composed. The way 
in which Hartmann confronts the question of the meaning of aesthetic experience 
(especially as address in Chapter 35 of his Aesthetics), that is, the way he raises the 
question of the value of aesthetic values is Nietzschean through and through. I would 
venture to suggest that Hartmann’s engagement in this question is a specific rein-
terpretation of the standpoint we come across in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy; I can 
only conjecture that this reinterpretation must have been triggered by Hartmann’s 
explicit awareness of the similar circumstances that underlie the composition of both 
works.
How are we to understand the question here formulated in a heavily Nietzs-
chean way, namely, the question of the value of aesthetic values? This question con-
cerns the existential significance of aesthetic experience in general, and of art, in par-
ticular. This issue calls for some clarification. 
First, one should stress that neither Hartmann nor Nietzsche employs the con-
cept of aesthetic experience. In the present context, this heavily over-determined term 
is meant to identify the kind of experience through which aesthetic values are given. 
Aesthetic experience differs from other types of experience in that it intends aesthetic 
values. We can intend different types of phenomena—theoretical, practical, aesthet-
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ic—only because we are capable of different types of experience. Such aesthetic values 
as beauty, the sublime, the graceful, the charming, the pleasing, the moving, the idyl-
lic, the comical, the humorous and the tragic fundamentally rely upon our capacity to 
experience the world aesthetically.
What, then, is the value of aesthetic experience? In The Birth of Tragedy, 
Nietzsche argued that the function of aesthetic experience (conceived as that expe-
rience, which can access aesthetic phenomena) is none other than that of making 
life liveable. “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
eternally justified” (Nietzsche, 2000, 52)—so runs Nietzsche’s most famous, mysteri-
ous, provocative and significant pronouncement that he formulates in his early work3. 
Hartmann’s answer to this very same question runs along the same lines, although, 
admittedly, it is more restrained: “basically, all experience of beauty (the state of being 
aesthetically valuable) has philosophical significance just because it bestows meaning 
upon our lives. For without our seeing a meaning in our lives over the course of it, we 
could not live” (Hartmann, 2014, 442). 
Like Nietzsche, Hartmann is committed to the view that our lives are intrinsi-
cally meaningless. So also, like Nietzsche, Hartmann is committed to the seemingly 
anti-metaphysical view that the only meaning our lives might have is the meaning we 
ourselves project upon it. Furthermore, like Nietzsche, Hartmann holds the view that 
what makes aesthetic experience valuable is the meaning-generating function that it 
performs. However, unlike the early Nietzsche (although, one might add, in line with 
Nietzsche’s thoughts in his more mature writings), Hartmann holds the view that aes-
thetic experience is one of the resources from which life can obtain its meaning and 
significance.
In the concluding pages of Hartmann’s Aesthetics, we witness the reappearance 
of some “inexpungible metaphysical problems,” among which, “one of the oldest and 
most peremptory is that of the sense and meaning of the world and of human life” 
(Hartmann, 2014, 438). Insofar as one’s life is guided by a belief in a higher power, this 
question does not arise: it is answered from the start. Yet especially under the circum-
stances that surround the composition of this work, it is terribly hard to retain such a 
belief: for the author of this work, hiding from the outside world not far from Berlin, 
during the final months, weeks, and days of the war, everything must have spoken 
against it. Hartmann’s following remarks should not surprise us: “…if faith collapses, 
then the problems, arising as though out of nothingness, are suddenly there. And then 
3 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche repeats this dictum on two other occasions. See Nietzsche (2000, 
22, 141).
252 SAULIUS GENIUSAS
they may straightaway become life threatening. For who would want to live a life that 
has no sense?” (Hartmann, 2014, 438).
Like Nietzsche, Hartmann asserts that the question concerning the sense and 
meaning of the world and of human life has always been provided with one and the 
same answer, which both identify as metaphysical, in general, and Platonic, in par-
ticular. Hartmann maintains that this answer has always tacitly relied upon two prin-
ciples: presumably, a) meaning can only lie at the origins of things; it cannot emerge in 
the world in the course of its history; b) so also, meaning can only inhere in the whole 
of the world; it cannot emerge from a part, or pass from a part to the whole (Hart-
mann, 2014, 439). Yet the world experience that underlies the composition of Hart-
mann’s Aesthetics is such that it becomes impossible to hold on to the view that the 
sense and meaning covers the world and human life in their entirety, either in terms 
vertical depth and horizontal breadth. Small wonder, then, that Hartmann would as-
sert that both assumptions have proved to be unjustified prejudices. In Hartmann, 
much like in Nietzsche, such a response is not presented in a form of a worked-out 
argument, but just in the form of a descriptive statement: it relies, one could say, on 
phenomenological rather than on logical self-evidence.
“What then remains? A world devoid of sense? In such a world man cannot live, 
at least not in full awareness of its senselessness” (Hartmann, 2014, 439). We cannot 
help but must consider alternatives. With this in mind, let us reverse the two assump-
tions, which have lost their hold on us: they no longer appear either as self-evident 
affirmations or as sound inferences that we draw from some other self-evident affir-
mations. Can we conceive of a meaning that does not lie at the origin of things but 
flows into the world post factum? Can we conceive of a meaning that originates not in 
the whole, but in a part, and that passes from a part to a whole? Hartmann answers 
both questions affirmatively. One could argue that despite his resistance to all met-
aphysical approaches to the question at hand, Hartmann’s answer relies on a certain 
metaphysics, namely, on the view that the world is neither inherently meaningful, nor 
is it hostile to meaning. Avoiding both extremes, Hartmann contends that the world is 
just indifferent to meaning4. Building his case on such a metaphysical basis, Hartmann 
maintains that a human being can find himself in a meaningful world if, and only if, 
he himself bestows meaning upon the world. By itself, this does not mean that, as 
4 In this regard, one could argue that Hartmann is more consistent than the early Nietzsche, who is 
all too quick to reinterpret the world’s indifference to meaning as the world’s hostility to meaning. 
This becomes especially noticeable in the so-called wisdom of Silenus, which Nietzsche accepts as 
representative of the tragic wisdom of the Greeks: “what is best of all is […] not to be born, not to 
be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon” (Nietzsche, 2000, 42).
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Nietzsche has it, “the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenome-
non” (Nietzsche, 2000, 22). Rather, “every morally good act, every wise thought, every 
adequate response to a value, is meaningful and bestows additional meaning just out 
of itself alone” (Hartmann, 2014, 439). Thus, the sense and meaning of the world and 
of human life draws its sustenance from human acts, for it is these acts alone that can 
provide both with meaning, if they are to have any meaning at all. Only a world that is 
indifferent to meaning can become meaningful. We could describe Hartmann’s stand-
point as an anti-Platonic metaphysics that clarifies how an intrinsically meaningless 
world can become meaningful. 
Hartmann, much like Nietzsche before him, maintains that the only meaning 
that the world and human life might have will be the meaning that we ourselves will 
bestow on in. Presumably, such an act of sense-bestowal is the subjective origin that 
renders life liveable. However, in contrast to Nietzsche, Hartman does not contend 
that only by bestowing meaning on life aesthetically can we render life liveable. What 
we have said so far does not tell us anything about aesthetic values or the concrete way 
in which they can bestow meaning on life.
Hartmann considers it to be an obvious fact that all meaning in the world is 
connected to values, be they moral, practical, or aesthetic. With this in the back of 
our minds, we can ask: is there anything specific about the bestowal of meaning upon 
the world and human life that derives specifically from aesthetic values? Following 
Kant, Hartmann holds the view that the aesthetic attitude is essentially disinterested 
and non-practical. Hartmann takes this to mean that when we relate to the world aes-
thetically, we see it as infused with intrinsic, and not just instrumental, value. I would 
contend that a being that recognizes surrounding things as intrinsically meaningful 
cannot help but must consider life liveable. To find oneself in the world that is soaked 
in aesthetic values is to have the “convincing feeling of standing face to face before 
something of absolutely intrinsic value—before something for whose sake alone it 
would be worth living, regardless of how the conditions of one’s life stand otherwise” 
(Hartmann, 2014, 440) and despite all the “compromises, half-measures and distress” 
(Hartmann, 2014, 442) that otherwise, life affords.
There are things in life more likely to occur the more one tries to avoid them. So 
also, there are things in life less likely to occur the more one tries to realize them. So ar-
gued Max Scheler in his Vom Sinn des Leidens (Scheler, 1992, 106), suggesting that pain 
and suffering exemplify the first group of things, while joy and happiness fall into the 
second category. When Hartmann speaks of “Scheler’s law” in his Aesthetics (Hartmann, 
2014, 364), he has this very structure of experience in mind. Thus, echoing Scheler’s 
view, Hartmann writes: “happiness can be striven after, but cannot be realized in striving. 
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Whoever strives for happiness destroys his chances for it almost necessarily” (Hartmann, 
2014, 366). I would suggest that this very structure of experience underlies Hartmann’s 
own solution to the problem he identifies as the problem of “the sense and meaning of 
the world and of human life” (Hartmann, 2014, 438). The more we seek this sense and 
meaning, the more it withdraws. It can be secured only behind one’s back. One way to 
secure it is to turn to aesthetic values, discover them in the world of things around us.
Let us recapitulate Hartmann’s argument. Insofar as we are capable of seeing 
the world as infused with aesthetic values, we are capable of seeing it as intrinsically 
valuable. Insofar as we are capable of seeing it as intrinsically valuable, we render the 
world both liveable and meaningful. The capacity that we, humans, have to recognize 
aesthetic qualities in things around us is exactly what enables meaning to “penetrate 
the darkness of suffering and distress” by “entering those places where other pow-
ers have lost their strength to succour us” (Hartmann, 2014, 442). Thus, much like 
Nietzsche before him, Hartmann also appears to suggest that his preoccupation with 
aesthetics during the war years is not a matter of apolitical escapism, but quite on the 
contrary, it is a direct way of confronting the fundamental problem the world faced at 
the time and, one might add, the very same problem it continues to face, namely, the 
problem of ‘the sense and meaning of the world and of human life.’ According to Hart-
mann’s paradoxical and provocative thesis, despite all the physical, moral and spiritual 
destruction, the human capacity to undergo aesthetic experiences remains one of the 
fundamental ways in which this problem can be resolved. 
What sense are we to make of the argument just offered? According to Hart-
mann, one of the things that makes life liveable is our capacity to see the world filled 
with aesthetic qualities and values. Yet does this argument not beg the question? We 
need to raise the basic question and problematize a seemingly obvious assumption: is 
it really true that we can see the world as beautiful, that is, to see it soaked in aesthetic 
qualities? The answer is by no means self-evident. For a view contrary to Hartmann’s, 
it suffices to recall Jean-Paul Sartre’s conclusion to his The Imaginary:
The real is never beautiful. Beauty is a value that can only ever be applied to the imagi-
nary and that carries the nihilation of the world in its essential structure […]. To say that 
one ‘takes’ an aesthetic attitude to life is to confuse the real and the imaginary […]. The 
extreme beauty of a woman kills the desire for her […]. In order to desire her it is neces-
sary to forget that she is beautiful, since desire is a plunge into the heart of existence, into 
what is most contingent and most absurd. (Sartre, 2004, 193–194)
A detailed analysis of Sartre’s early view on art would take us too far astray. 
In the present context, I only wish to stress that, according to Sartre, such aesthetic 
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categories as beauty have no place in the horizon of actuality. With Sartre’s position 
in the back of our minds, we have to ask: when Hartmann asserts that we are capable 
of seeing the world as aesthetically valuable, does he not conflate consciousness of 
irreality with consciousness of reality, although they plainly are two distinct modes of 
intentionality?
The answer is a definite No. Hartmann is in full agreement with Sartre as far as 
the insight into the derealizing function of aesthetic experience is concerned (more 
on that later). However, while accepting Sartre’s premises, Hartmann is nonetheless 
led to fundamentally different conclusions, namely, to the view that human life can 
bestow aesthetic qualities upon our actual world experience. Here we touch upon a 
highly interesting thought in Hartmann, which was subsequently to be developed fur-
ther, especially in the works of Paul Ricoeur5. In full agreement with Sartre, Hartmann 
writes: “the aesthetic object is lifted out of the daily bustle, out of the obligations in 
life that weigh upon us, out of all of permanent features of the everyday” (Hartmann, 
2014, 442). Yet he continues this thought in a decidedly anti-Sartrean fashion: 
…the reverse manifests itself: the re-entry into our life of what had been lifted out of 
it—but not to assimilate itself to it, and thereby vanish, but rather to give to life what is 
for its needs of the greatest importance: meaningfulness. Perhaps one should put it more 
cautiously: it is the knowing or beholding of a meaning-content. (Hartmann, 2014, 442)
We can take this to mean that, according to Hartmann, the aesthetic experience 
one undergoes is a derealizing experience that unfolds in the field, which Sartre iden-
tifies as irreality. Nonetheless, what one experiences in this field can be re-transcribed 
into the field of actuality. Aesthetic experience can re-enter the domain of actual ex-
perience by lending it what it otherwise lacks, namely, meaningfulness. It re-enters 
the field of actual experience not by transforming the things we encounter around 
us, but transfiguring their manners of appearance. As far as we are dealing only with 
aesthetic experience, we can further say that we are dealing with intrinsic meaningful-
ness exclusively: with values which, as Hartmann puts it, ‘burden us with nothing’ and 
‘demand and foster nothing’: they are gifts, and nothing more than gifts, which call for 
us to behold them and take part in the ‘pure joy’ they offer us.
In philosophical literature of the second half of the twentieth century, and es-
pecially in French philosophy, we come across quite extensive literature on given-
ness in general, and gifts, in particular. The analysis of this theme has always served 
one and the same purpose, namely, that of demonstrating that subjectivity cannot be 
5 Here I am referring to Paul Ricoeur’s essays on productive imagination, including his unpublished 
lectures on the imagination, which he delivered at the University of Chicago in 1975.
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conceived as the transcendental origin meaning. In this regard, Hartmann’s scattered 
reflections on gift giving are highly refreshing. His analysis does not suggest that the 
problematic of the gift somehow requires that we speak of the death of the subject in 
more or less explicit ways. Quite on the contrary, giving of gifts “takes two, and there 
is something the recipient must supply: the taking” (Hartmann, 2014, 442–443). In 
short, in a desubjectivized world, there can be no gifts and no gift giving. 
Aesthetic experience is a peculiar way of experiencing, which is not to be con-
fused with natural experience. To see the world as beautiful, we first and foremost 
need to “learn to see” (Hartmann, 2014, 281). Here we touch upon the indissoluble 
interrelation of mimesis and poesis, of imitation and creativity, which Hartmann con-
ceptualizes as a subjective interplay of forces that underlie art creation (Hartmann, 
2014, Ch. 20). It is interesting to note that the example Hartmann uses to illustrate the 
artistic effects of such an interrelation is the very same example that Paul Ricoeur will 
employ in his Lectures on the Imagination, while speaking of the power of productive 
imagination. “It is true that the painter—and yet not before his art reached a certain 
level of development—was the first to discover ‘the landscape’ and thereupon also 
taught the layman to see nature for himself ” (Hartmann, 2014, 281). We can take this 
to mean that, according to Hartmann, there is nothing natural about our capacity to 
see the world as beautiful, presuming that we have such a capacity. It’s a learned capac-
ity; but if so, then we can further add, that this capacity can also be forgotten.
Let us recapitulate the path we have taken so far. The world can be meaningful 
if, and only if, human life bestows meaning upon it. To bestow meaning upon the 
world is to bestow upon it certain values. One way to do so is to bestow upon the 
world aesthetic values. This can be done by means of learning how to see, that is, by 
means of re-transcribing the aesthetic experience we undergo in the domain of irreal-
ity into the domain of actuality.
But when so much is said, further problems open up. We now realize that the 
bestowal of meaning upon human life and the world itself rests upon a more primitive 
bestowal, namely, the bestowal of values upon the aesthetic object, which originally, 
can only be given in the domain of irreality. From the question concerning our pre-
sumed capacity to see the world as infused with aesthetic values we are led back to the 
question concerning the bestowal of values in the arts. 
Let us briefly trace Hartmann’s analysis of this issue, which he presents under 
the heading of the bestowing of forms in the arts (Hartmann, 2014, Ch. 17). Hart-
mann’s analysis is guided by the insight that aesthetic creativity entails the elements 
of selection, omission and supplementation. Thus, the artist never simply imitates the 
surrounding nature. At least as far as representational artworks are concerned, the 
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artist selects certain aspects at the expense of others; s/he thus omits other aspects as 
unworthy of representation; so also, s/he supplements in the artwork itself what nature 
itself does not offer. In short, the process of the creation of the artwork is always al-
ready a fusion of mimesis and poesis, of imitation and creativity. Such an interplay of 
selection, omission and supplementation gives rise to the idea that the artist conceives 
aesthetically and wishes to actualize as an aesthetic object.
Building on such a basis, Hartmann singles out three moments that make up 
the structure of aesthetic creativity. First, aesthetic creativity brings about a trans-
formation in the structure of the human psychic elements and their presentation in 
non-psychic and non-human medium. By this we are to understand that, according 
to Hartmann, something alive is shaped in lifeless matter, be it in words, colours, or 
stone. We face here the objectivation of what initially appears within the boundaries 
of inwardness—a mere insight, or a preliminary form, which in the initial stage of 
aesthetic creativity is not yet materialized. Its materialization, or as Hartmann has it, 
its objectivation constitutes the first element of artistic creativity.
Second, we can further qualify the objectivation of which we here speak as the 
aesthetic object’s transformation into something unreal. By this we are to understand 
that when the artist shapes something, that is, when the artist transforms the initial 
idea into a material substance, s/he does not actualize the object of intuition, but only 
offers its representation. Thus “the figures that the poet creates are not made real 
by him, any more than the things that the painter shows us: they all remain unreal, 
and make no pretence to reality” (Hartmann, 2014, 246). Otherwise put, the artistic 
objectivation is nothing other than the object’s derealisation: as far as aesthetic per-
ception is concerned, the material object loses its reality by obtaining its aesthetic 
phenomenality. Thus, looking at a painting as a painting, we no longer see the canvas, 
but only the representation; when we hear a musical work, we no longer hear sounds, 
but rather tones and melodies; last but not least, when we are enraptured by a novel, 
we do not see pieces of paper bound to each other, but are absorbed in the meaning 
of the novel, etc. 
Thirdly, such an objectivation of what originally was only a psychic element, an 
objectivation, which at the same time marked the material object’s derealization, is a 
transformation that results in the aesthetic object’s greater intuitive clarity. By this we 
are to understand that insofar as the insight that underlies aesthetic creativity is given 
in its original purely psychic form, it remains largely incomplete, incoherent, and im-
precise, and that it gains completeness, coherence and precision only in the process of 
its artistic development. “The poet, the painter, the sculptor, yes, even the musician, 
each lifts these objects out of their shadowy vagueness and makes them ‘indirectly’ 
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visible, audible, imaginable” (Hartmann, 2014, 246). Thus, the connection of reality 
and clarity that we normally assume in life loses its validity when we are confronted 
with aesthetic intuitivity and aesthetic clarity. The latter two are to be understood as 
‘intuitability of a higher order,’ which is identical with ‘second seeing’ or ‘beholding’ 
that is attached to perception as a founded stratum, which relies upon perception, 
although cannot be reduced to perception.
At this point, we are in the position to understand Hartmann’s contention that 
aesthetic experience relies upon the human capacity ‘to learn how to see.’ No matter 
how paradoxical it might sound, perceiving an artwork as an artwork relies upon us 
having learned how to perceive it. The processes of selection, omission and supple-
mentation that underlie the creation of artworks provide us with sufficient proof that 
aesthetic seeing is irreducible to natural seeing. Even in the case of representational 
art, when we see an aesthetic object, we recognize the moments of selection, omis-
sion and supplementation, that is, we recognize that an artwork is a unity of mimesis 
and poeisis, and only as such can it give rise to aesthetic appreciation. An artwork, 
conceived as an embodied form that provides both the artist and the audience with 
increased intuitive clarity, can be seen and appreciated only insofar as we learn how to 
see it and appreciate it.
How, then, is it possible to for us to recognize aesthetic qualities not only in 
artworks, but also in the world that surrounds us? That is, how can aesthetic values 
re-enter our lives after being lifted out of it, although not to assimilate with objects 
around us, and thus vanish, but rather “to give life what is for its needs of the greatest 
importance: meaningfulness?” (Hartmann, 2014, 442)  I would suggest that such a 
re-entry relies upon two conditions: 1) aesthetic values cannot be reified; no one has 
the power to transform them into things among things. Here we are not discussing 
any real change in things. Rather, aesthetic values can be experienced only phenom-
enally, only as qualities that affect appearances of things. 2) The manner in which the 
actual world appears to us can be permeated with aesthetic qualities if, and only if, 
one learns how to see, and this learning to see relies upon the processes of selection, 
omission and supplementation. Otherwise put, the infusion of the world with aesthet-
ic values relies upon a creative interplay of perception and aesthetic fantasy, which in 
their unison provide us with a sense that we see actual objects around us, while none-
theless modifying their manners of appearance by supplementing them with aesthetic 
qualities. The aesthetic way of bestowing meaning on life relies upon such a creative 
interplay of these two forces. Recall Hartmann’s intriguing contention that “without 
our seeing a meaning in our lives over the course of it, we could not live” (Hartmann, 
2014, 442). At this point we can say that the meaning in question does not rely upon 
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a real change in things, but only upon a subjective reorientation: “nothing is removed, 
yet a spiritual good is bestowed” (Hartmann, 2014, 442). It is our learning how to see 
that renders such a subjective reorientation possible.
In his introduction to Hartmann’s Aesthetics, Eugene Kelly remarks: 
…if Hartmann is generally unread today, that may be due to the fact that he speaks out 
of a tradition of art that has been successfully deconstructed, and new forms of art have 
liberated themselves from older traditions and created our not always brave new world. 
(Hartmann, 2014, xxxii)
This estimation is largely correct: no matter how sympathetic one might be to 
Hartmann’s works, it is by no means easy to see how the concepts he employs and the 
phenomena he describes in his Aesthetics could be helpfully employed in the analysis 
of contemporary art, which pays such a strong emphasis on incoherence and random-
ness. Of course, we can say the same about most of the modern classical theories in 
aesthetics, from Hume and Kant onwards. It appears to be undeniable that much of 
contemporary art is a rebellion against these very theories. However, such a critical 
assessment, even if it is accepted, does not mean that Hartmann’s aesthetics is just as 
powerless in the face of classical traditions.
In the place of conclusion, I want to return to the circumstances under which 
Hartmann’s Aesthetics was written. What sense are we to make of Hartmann’s deci-
sion to write a work on aesthetics during the months that were to decide the world’s 
history? Moreover, what sense are we to make of all the resilience, serenity and ded-
ication that the completion of this voluminous study must have called for? Needless 
to say, we do not encounter any references to the actual state of affairs in Hartmann’s 
Aesthetics. Are we, then, to conclude that this work is a straightforward expression 
of philosophical escapism, and thus of philosophy’s own irrelevance in the course of 
world’s history? 
Should one consider such a view to be too dismissive, one would have to look 
for ways to justify Hartmann’s silence and indifference. Here I tried to offer one pos-
sible clarification of this matter, a clarification that focuses on Hartmann’s reflections 
on what could possible make human life meaningful and liveable. The question that 
is posed here is the very same that we come across not only in Nietzsche’s Birth of 
Tragedy, but also in Jean-Paul Sartre’s famous lecture, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” 
which was delivered just a month after Hartmann completed his original manuscript. 
Let us not forget that Sartre was recognized as one of the main philosophers of the 
post war years precisely due to the popularity of this lecture, which was received al-
most as a manifesto that spelled out the new philosophical principles in accordance 
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with which post war Europe was to be rebuilt. I wish to stress that Sartre’s central point 
in this lecture is the very same that we come across in Hartmann’s Aesthetics, and the 
very same that I focused on above: if human life is to have meaning, this meaning will 
derive from human life itself. A significant difference between Sartre and Hartmann 
on this issue concerns Hartmann’s contention that aesthetic experience is one of the 
fundamental sources from which human life can draw its sustenance. In “Existential-
ism is a Humanism,” Sartre does not explore such a possibility. With this in mind, let 
me conclude by saying that Hartmann’s Aesthetics is a living testimony to the fact that 
philosophical engagements in ‘the problems of the day’ do not always, and should not 
always, take direct form. Precisely because philosophy is not politics, it must create its 
own ways to confront the problems we face. 
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